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I
n recent years, central banks around the world have greatly increased 
the monetary policy information they have provided the public. For 
example, many central banks have become more explicit about the 
longer-run objectives of monetary policy, such as long-run inflation ob-
jectives, and provided more detailed information about the monetary 
policy process. The Federal Reserve has taken a number of actions to 
promote transparency including, most recently, the announcement of 
enhancements to the FOMC’s economic forecasts that are released to 
the public (Federal Open Market Committee).
The movement toward increased transparency arises largely from 
the view that increased transparency has important benefits, including 
more effective monetary policy. This view is based on theoretical and 
empirical research that has emphasized the importance of public expec-
tations about monetary policy as a key factor in determining interest 
rates and other asset prices. In particular, this research suggests that 
improved predictability of monetary policy may reduce the volatility 
of asset prices and make monetary policy more effective by increasing a 
central bank’s leverage over longer-term interest rates.
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7The view that policy transparency may increase the predictability of 
monetary policy has found considerable empirical support. A number 
of recent studies used information from federal funds futures, Treasury 
bills, and Eurodollar futures markets to show that financial markets 
in recent years have been better able to predict future policy actions 
over relatively short-run horizons, for example, from one to six months 
ahead. However, there are relatively few studies of predictability over 
longer-term horizons, for example, one or more years ahead. Longer-
horizon predictability of policy actions is especially important because 
it helps determine how much leverage central banks have over longer-
term interest rates. 
This article uses information from the Blue Chip Long Range Fi-
nancial Forecasts to examine whether longer-horizon predictability has 
been associated with increased transparency. The Blue Chip survey, 
taken twice a year, asks a panel of forecasters to give their projections 
of interest rates over a ten-year horizon. Included in the survey are pro-
jections of the federal funds rate, which serves as the Federal Reserve’s 
principal operating target. Thus, the survey provides an estimate of the 
federal funds rate path over the next ten years. Comparing these fore-
casts of the federal funds rate with the actual federal funds rate allows 
us to judge whether private sector forecasts of monetary policy have 
improved as policy transparency has increased.
The analysis in this article suggests several interesting conclusions. 
First, consistent with results using futures data, there has been a marked 
reduction in survey forecast errors at short-term horizons—but less 
improvement at longer horizons. Second, to the extent private sector 
longer-horizon forecasts of future monetary policy have improved in 
recent years, most of the improvement occurred from 2003 to 2006, 
when the Federal Reserve provided more explicit guidance about the 
future path of the federal funds rate. During this period, forecast errors 
over all horizons dropped remarkably. Indeed, this period appears to 
have driven most of the improvement in the Blue Chip survey forecasts 
seen over the entire 1986-2007 sample period. Third, the survey evi-
dence reported in this article does not support the finding of some stud-
ies that forecasting improved suddenly after 1994. Fourth, the longer-
horizon forecast errors have been largest when policy was being actively 
tightened or eased, especially during the 1990-92 and 2001-03 periods 
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of extended policy easing. Finally, longer-horizon forecast errors ap-
pear to have diminished during periods of tightening, but not during 
periods of easing. 
The first section of this article provides a framework for discuss-
ing monetary policy transparency and how transparency is related to 
predictability of future monetary policy actions. The second section re-
views existing evidence on improved short-run predictability of policy. 
The final section presents a detailed analysis of longer-horizon forecasts 
from the Blue Chip survey.
I.  MONETARY POLICY TRANSPARENCY AND  
PREDICTABILITY
Central banks have been motivated to provide more information 
about monetary policy to the public, in part, because improved trans-
parency may increase the effectiveness of policy by increasing financial 
markets’ ability to predict future policy actions. Knowledge of the fu-
ture path of monetary policy is important because this path is a key 
element in determining interest rates and other asset prices. In recent 
years, the Federal Reserve has taken a number of steps to improve policy 
transparency, which should improve the public’s understanding of the 
monetary policy and increase the ability of financial markets to predict 
future policy actions.
Benefits of transparency 
Generally speaking, transparency encompasses the information a 
central bank provides to the public about its policy objectives, its out-
look for the economy, and the actions needed to reach its objectives 
given the outlook for the economy. While a central bank has other 
reasons to be transparent, including improved political accountability, 
this article focuses on how transparency may increase the effectiveness 
of monetary policy.
A useful definition of transparency and its potential benefits can be 
found in Swanson (p. 793):
•   Transparency is the amount of information about the goals and 
conduct of monetary policy released to the public.10  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
•   Transparency should lead to an improvement in financial market 
and private sector understanding of how the central bank will set 
policy as a function of the state of the economy.
•   This improved understanding should lead to an increase in the pri-
vate sector’s ability to forecast the central bank’s policy instrument.
The Federal Reserve and other central banks currently use a short-
term interest rate as a policy instrument. Without transparency, uncer-
tainty about how the central bank will set this interest rate in the future 
can lead to considerable volatility of market interest rates as markets 
frequently change their views of future policy in response to new eco-
nomic information. In addition, without transparency, markets may 
frequently be surprised by the timing and magnitude of policy actions, 
leading to additional volatility. 
More important, transparency about the likely future path of the 
policy instrument can also be helpful in increasing the central bank’s 
ability to influence longer-term interest rates. The expectations theory 
of interest rates suggests that long-term interest rates can be viewed 
as an average of the current short-term interest rate and the sequence 
of expected short-term rates over the maturity of the security. Since 
short-term rates will depend to a considerable degree on the policy in-
terest rate, a market interest rate of any maturity can be expressed as an 
average of the current policy rate and the expected path of this policy 
rate over the maturity of the security. Viewed in this way, the expected 
future path for the central bank’s policy rate serves as the underpinning 
for the entire structure of market interest rates. Thus, financial markets 
have great interest in learning how the central bank is likely to adjust 
this path in the future (Sellon).
The expectations theory also suggests that a central bank’s ability 
to influence longer-term interest rates depends on whether a change 
in the policy rate is expected to be long-lasting. When a central bank 
changes the policy rate and does not indicate the future path of the rate, 
financial markets have to make their own judgment as to this future 
path. If markets believe the policy action is temporary and is likely to 
be reversed in the near future, the effect of the policy action on short-
term rates will be large, but the action will have little effect on longer-
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be long-lasting or expect further changes in the policy rate in the same 
direction, the effect on longer-term rates will be much larger. 
When a central bank is not very transparent about the future set-
ting of the policy rate, it defers to the market in setting the expected 
path for this rate, and markets may or may not move longer-term rates 
where the central bank thinks they should go. In contrast, if the central 
bank provides more information that allows markets to better judge the 
future policy path, it may be able to exert more leverage over longer-
term rates.
A practical example may help illustrate this important point. At 
the start of an economic slowdown, a central bank will typically begin 
lowering its policy rate to offset the economic weakness. While short-
term market rates will follow the policy rate closely, what happens to 
longer-term rates will depend on how much financial markets expect 
the policy rate will be reduced over time. If markets think the economic 
slowdown and decline in the policy rate will be temporary, long-term 
rates will not fall much. If the slowdown turns out to be more severe 
and the policy rate is cut further, markets will eventually lower longer-
term rates. However, if markets knew at the outset how far the policy 
rate was likely to fall, longer-term rates would fall sooner and provide 
more stimulus to the economy. Thus, the degree of central bank trans-
parency about the future path of the policy rate can be very important 
in determining the central bank’s leverage over longer-term interest 
rates and the influence of its policy actions.
a framework for thinking about transparency
To achieve its long-run policy objectives, a central bank sets the 
level of its short-run policy interest rate and alters this rate in response 
to changing economic conditions. A convenient way of formalizing the 
policy process is to think of a central bank as following a Taylor rule:
  r = r* + g (YE - Y*) + h (πE - π*)    g,h >0.
According to this rule, a central bank sets its policy rate (r) based on 
the expected gap between actual output (Y) and potential output (Y*) 
and the expected gap between inflation (π) and its inflation objective 
(π*). When the output gap (YE - Y*) and inflation gap (πE - π*) are zero, 
the central bank sets the policy rate equal to r*, which can be viewed as 
the long-run equilibrium policy rate, or “neutral” policy rate.12  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
The central bank implements policy by moving the actual policy 
rate above or below the neutral rate when the output gap and inflation 
gap are nonzero. For example, if an economic shock causes weaker eco-
nomic growth, the central bank would lower the policy rate below the 
neutral rate by an amount that depends on the expected output and in-
flation gaps. As the economy responds to the monetary policy stimulus, 
the output and inflation gaps will diminish, and the central bank will 
raise the policy rate back to neutral.
The neutral rate plays an important role in the evolution of policy 
over time. The neutral rate can be thought of as consisting of two com-
ponents: an equilibrium real interest rate, which is determined by pro-
ductivity and other real factors, and the central bank’s long-run inflation 
objective. The neutral rate will generally not be constant as both the real 
rate component and the inflation objective may change over time.
While no central bank adheres strictly to this simple Taylor rule, 
considerable empirical evidence suggests that the behavior of many 
central banks can be approximated by such a relationship (Taylor, Clar-
ida, Gali, and Gertler; Judd and Rudebusch). Thus, it can be helpful in 
discussing the types of information a central bank might provide to the 
public to achieve greater transparency.
One obvious way that a central bank following a Taylor rule could 
achieve greater transparency is to provide information on the path for 
the policy rate, which it would derive from applying the rule, and its es-
timate of the neutral rate. Financial markets could then use this path to 
price financial assets. While central banks have become more transpar-
ent, few have gone so far as to publish their expected path for the policy 
rate.1 The few banks that have begun to do so typically provide a short-
run path over a few quarters ahead. Central banks have been reluctant 
to announce an extended path, in part, because the path could change 
frequently as economic and inflation forecasts change (Kahn).
Central banks could also achieve greater transparency without pub-
lishing a policy path by providing the public with additional information 
about its policy decision process. For example, in the context of the Tay-
lor rule, a central bank could provide various forms of information: its 
estimate of potential output (Y*) and its inflation objective (π*), how it is 
likely to respond to changes in the output and inflation gaps (g and h), 
and its economic and inflation forecasts (YE and πE). Indeed, if a central 
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providing information on its estimate of potential output, its inflation 
objective, and its forecast for output and inflation may be sufficient to al-
low financial markets to construct a likely policy path without requiring 
the central bank to publish its own estimate of the path.
In thinking about the benefits of greater central bank transparency, 
it is important to recognize that the objective is not to eliminate private 
sector forecast errors. Indeed, the central bank’s policy path will change 
constantly as economic shocks hit the economy and economic forecasts 
change; so some forecast errors are inevitable. However, central banks 
would like to eliminate “unnecessary” errors that result from the pub-
lic’s misperception of a central bank’s policy objectives or its strategy for 
responding to economic shocks.
Steps toward greater transparency 
In recent years, the Federal Reserve has taken a number of formal 
steps toward greater transparency, beginning in 1994 with a decision to 
announce policy actions at the time of a decision. A chronology of these 
changes is shown in Table 1. Rather than providing a detailed discus-
sion of each of these actions, it may be helpful to focus on four major 
developments that have, or are likely to have, the largest impact on the 
predictability of monetary policy.
One of the most important developments, and a development that 
received no formal announcement, was a change in FOMC practices 
to make most policy decisions at regularly scheduled committee meet-
ings. From 1989 to 1992, for example, most policy actions were made, 
not at regularly scheduled meetings, but in conference calls between 
scheduled meetings. In fact, of 24 policy changes made during this 
period, only six were made at regularly scheduled meetings. Such a 
practice makes it very difficult for financial markets to anticipate when 
a policy change will occur and will likely lead to increased volatility in 
financial markets. In contrast, from 1994 to January 2008, only six of 
55 policy actions were taken outside of regularly scheduled meetings, 
typically in response to dramatic and unanticipated shocks to the econ-
omy and financial markets, such as the 1998 Russian debt and LTCM 
financial crisis or the events of September 11, 2001. Thus, since 1994, 
markets have generally had a much better idea of when a policy action 
was likely to occur.14  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
A second important step toward transparency was to accompany 
the announcement of a policy decision with a description of its ratio-
nale. By providing the reasoning behind a policy decision, the FOMC 
gave markets a better understanding of its interpretation of economic 
developments and the types of developments that were most significant 
in the committee’s decision. Over time, financial markets can use this 
information to gain a better appreciation of the committee’s objectives 
and how its actions are seen as achieving these objectives. 
A third step toward greater transparency was the FOMC’s increased 
emphasis on providing guidance about likely future policy actions. This 
guidance has taken different forms over time. In 1999, the committee 
provided language in its press statement that gave some indication of 
how the federal funds rate target was likely to change over the near 
term. In 2000, this information on the policy “tilt” was replaced by an 
assessment of the risks to economic growth and inflation and how these 
risks might be balanced, again giving an indication of the direction and 
likelihood of future moves in the federal funds rate objective. From 
2003 to 2006, this guidance became unusually explicit as the commit-
tee first signaled that the policy rate would be held at a low level for 
an extended period and later signaled that rates would be raised in a 
systematic fashion.2 Providing guidance in this way may improve finan-
Table 1
FEDERAL  RESERVE  STEPS  TOWARD  GREATER  POLICY 
TRAnSPAREnCY
February 1994 Began issuing a statement immediately following an FOMC meeting at 
which a decision was made to change policy, including a brief rationale 
for the policy change. Began a practice of making most policy decisions at 
regularly scheduled committee meetings.
May 1999 Began providing a statement after every meeting, regardless of whether a 
change in policy was made, and provided a brief rationale for the decision.   
The statement also included a policy “tilt” indicating how policy was likely 
to be adjusted in the near term.
February 2000 Replaced the policy “tilt” language with an assessment of the balance of 
risks to growth and inflation.
March 2002 Began providing votes of individual members and rationale for any dissents 
to the committee’s decision.
november 2007 Began providing more frequent and detailed forecasts of all FOMC mem-
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cial markets’ ability to predict policy actions over a short-term horizon 
extending several meetings ahead and, as discussed earlier, may increase 
the response of longer-term interest rates.
 Finally, and most recently, in november 2007, the FOMC an-
nounced an enhanced forecasting process (Federal Open Market Com-
mittee). As part of these new procedures, the committee will provide 
long-range forecasts of economic growth, inflation, and unemployment 
four times a year instead of semiannually. In the context of the Taylor 
rule discussion earlier, more frequent forecasts may help financial mar-
kets forecast the policy path more accurately. In addition, by provid-
ing forecasts over a longer, three-year horizon, the committee will be 
providing the public with a better indication of committee members’ 
estimates of the economy’s potential growth and longer-run inflation 
objectives (Bernanke).
II.    EVIDENCE  ON  SHORT-TERM  MONETARY  POLICY 
PREDICTABILITY
 In recent years, a number of studies have provided evidence sug-
gesting that increased monetary policy transparency may have contrib-
uted to an increased ability of financial markets to forecast future mon-
etary policy actions. Most of this research has used information from 
financial markets, generally the Treasury bill markets and the markets 
for federal funds and Eurodollar futures, and focuses on a relatively 
short-run horizon, from one day out to six months. 
In one early study, Roley and Sellon showed that, over the period 
1987-95, much of the response of interest rates on Treasury securities 
to monetary policy actions was anticipated well in advance of the policy 
action. In particular, one reason longer-term interest rates showed little 
response to changes in the federal funds rate target was because the 
policy action was anticipated by financial markets several months be-
fore the policy decision. Research by Hsu and Kugler and by Lange, 
Sack, and Whitesell went further and showed that the ability of finan-
cial markets to predict future policy actions improved considerably in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s as compared to the early 1980s. 
Interestingly, the improvement in policy predictability found in 
these studies began prior to the steps toward greater transparency that 
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behavior became more predictable to financial markets even before the 
move toward greater formal transparency. 
A number of recent studies have used information from the federal 
funds futures market to examine whether financial markets have shown 
evidence of improved policy predictability since the Federal Reserve’s 
move toward greater transparency in 1994 (Kuttner, Poole, Rasche, and 
Thornton; Lange, Sack, and Whitesell, Swanson). This literature has 
focused on two issues: how well financial markets can predict a future 
policy action and how far in advance markets are able to anticipate 
policy actions. 
These studies have shown a dramatic decline in the number and 
size of “policy surprises” in the post-1994 period. For example, Lange, 
Sack, and Whitesell note that from 1989 to 1993 nearly 60 percent of a 
change in the federal funds rate came as a surprise to financial markets.3 
In contrast, from 1994 to 2000, the policy surprise fell to only 24 per-
cent. A large part of this reduction can be directly traced to the Federal 
Reserve’s greater propensity to make policy decisions at regularly sched-
uled meetings since, as noted by Poole and Rasche, intermeeting policy 
actions are more likely to surprise financial markets.
While this research finds improvement in short-term policy pre-
dictability, it also suggests that the empirical results may be sensitive to 
the choice of sample period. For example, Swanson found that predic-
tion errors from the federal funds futures market trended down from 
1988 to 2003 and were considerably lower post-1994. However, the 
improved forecasting was not uniform. Indeed, he noted that short-
term prediction errors and policy surprises, after declining from 1994 
to 2000, increased considerably from 2001 to 2003. Swanson attribut-
ed this decline in forecast accuracy to the difficulty of forecasting policy 
during a period in which the policy instrument was changing rapidly. 
Data for a more recent time period (2003-07) show even greater 
improvement in financial markets’ ability to predict monetary policy. 
For example, Kwan found considerable improvement in short-term 
predictability at both one-month and six-month forecasting horizons. 
Indeed, at a one-month forecast horizon, he found that federal funds 
rate prediction errors declined from 15 basis points from 1989 to 1993 
to seven basis points from 1994 to 2003 and to only two basis points 
from 2003 to 2007. Similarly, at a six-month horizon, Kwan found that Economic REviEw • ThiRd quaRTER 2008  17
prediction errors declined from 80 basis points from 1989 to 1993, to 
48 basis points from 1994 to 2003, and to 21 basis points from 2003 
to 2007. Interestingly, the federal funds rate target was also changing 
rapidly during much of the 2003-07 period. As we will discuss later, 
however, in this period the Federal Reserve provided more information 
about the future short-run path of policy that may have enabled mar-
kets to produce better forecasts. 
Finally, in comparing the pre-1994 period with a sample from 
1999 to 2006, Carlson, Craig, Higgins, and Melick found improved 
forecast accuracy and fewer policy surprises. These authors also looked 
at how far in advance markets can accurately predict policy actions. 
They found improvement over time horizons from one day to 90 days 
prior to an FOMC meeting, with the largest improvement occurring at 
the longer horizons.
One important question about this evidence of improved policy 
predictability is whether the improvement is due to greater monetary 
policy transparency or to other factors. For example, over the last 20 
years, the volatility of real GDP growth has declined sharply, while in-
flation rates have been lower and less volatile. Thus, it is possible that 
markets’ increased ability to predict future policy actions may have re-
sulted from improved forecasting of the economy rather than greater 
knowledge of monetary policy objectives and procedures. In addition, 
it has been claimed that during the Greenspan era, future policy actions 
were sometimes leaked to financial markets prior to an FOMC meet-
ing, resulting in fewer policy surprises.
Swanson examines both of these alternative explanations and finds 
them lacking. Using data from the Blue Chip Consensus forecasts, he 
finds that private sector forecasts of real GDP and inflation from 1991 
to 2003 did not improve to the same extent as forecasts of short-term 
interest rates. Swanson also finds that the improvement in interest rate 
forecasts extends beyond the next FOMC meeting, suggesting that in-
formation leaks prior to an FOMC meeting are not the main factor 
driving increased policy predictability.
III.   SURVEY EVIDENCE ON MONETARY POLICY    
PREDICTABILITY
Although recent research suggests that financial markets’ ability to 
forecast monetary policy has improved as policy transparency has in-18  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
creased, most studies have focused on relatively short forecast horizons. 
Evidence on policy predictability at longer horizons is more difficult to 
obtain, in part because futures markets tend to be less liquid at longer 
horizons and it becomes more difficult to extract policy expectations 
from other factors that might influence market interest rates. An alter-
native approach is to use survey evidence on monetary policy expecta-
tions. This article uses information from the Blue Chip Financial Fore-
casts to obtain estimates of the expected future monetary policy path. 
Analysis of the forecast errors from the Blue Chip survey confirms im-
provement at short-term horizons but shows much less improvement at 
longer horizons. A more detailed study of the forecast errors from the 
Blue Chip survey reveals significant asymmetries in the forecast errors 
in periods in which policy is changing, with important implications for 
the Federal Reserve’s leverage over longer-term interest rates.
Survey evidence on policy expectations
The Blue Chip survey, published monthly, contains short-term fore-
casts for interest rates for the next five quarters. Twice a year, however, 
the regular survey is supplemented by a series of longer-range forecasts 
for interest rates—including the federal funds rate  —out to a horizon of 
ten years. For example, survey respondents are asked for their forecast 
of the average federal funds rate for each of the next five years and then 
the expected five-year average for the federal funds rate for the period 
five to ten years ahead. By combining this information on longer hori-
zons with the regular five quarter forecasts, it is possible to construct an 
expected federal funds rate path over the next ten years.
The expected policy path constructed from a recent Blue Chip 
survey, taken in november 2007 and reported in the December 2007 
edition of Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, is shown in Chart 1.4 Accord-
ing to this path, survey participants expected the existing 4.5 percent 
federal funds rate to be reduced to 4.2 percent in the first quarter of 
2008 and to 4 percent in the second quarter. Participants then expected 
the rate to be raised beginning in 2009, reaching a long-run average of 
4.6 percent in 2011. Since the federal funds rate was lowered to 3 per-
cent in January 2008, survey participants clearly judged the direction 
of the short-run policy change correctly but were far off in terms of the 



















ExPECTED FEDERAL FUnDS RATE PATH
considerably larger than suggested by the empirical studies cited earlier 
but is, as we will see, quite consistent with similar episodes in the past 
when policy was eased rapidly.
Policy paths for each survey date from 1986 to 2007, constructed 
along the lines of Chart 1, are shown in Chart 2, with the november 
2007 path highlighted in blue. These paths have a number of interesting 
properties. The expected federal funds rate shows a clear tendency to re-
vert to its long-run value in about three years. This pattern is consistent 
with what might be generated by a Taylor rule, where a central bank 
alters the target interest rate in the short run to respond to output and 
inflation gaps but then returns the policy rate to neutral over time. 
A second interesting feature of the policy paths shown in Chart 
2 is that the long-run expected funds rate is not constant but moves 
around over time. In fact, from 1986 to 2007, the long-run expected 
federal funds rate in the Blue Chip survey declined from around 7.2 
to 4.6 percent (Chart 3). Much of this decline appears to be due to a 
reduction in long-run inflation expectations, which fall from 4.4 to 2.3 
percent in the Blue Chip surveys taken over this period.20  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
analysis of survey forecast errors
These policy paths can be used to examine how accurate survey 
participants were at various forecast horizons. In the analysis, we look 
at forecast errors at horizons of one, two, four, and eight quarters ahead. 
At each horizon, the forecast error is the difference between the average 
federal funds rate in the quarter minus the expected funds rate for that 
quarter from the survey.5 
Absolute errors for forecast horizons of one, four, and eight quar-
ters are shown in Chart 4, with the two-quarter horizon omitted for 
clarity. Errors are clearly much smaller for the one-quarter horizon and 
have shown some tendency to decline over time, especially since 2003. 
Errors for the four- and eight-quarter horizons are considerably larger 
and do not appear to have declined over time. Interestingly, the largest 
errors at the four- and eight-quarter horizons appear to occur during 
periods in the early 1990s and early part of this decade when policy was 
eased considerably. These errors are much larger than those occurring 
during periods when policy was tightened, such as 1994, 1999-2000, 
and 2004-06. The relationship between forecast errors and the stance of 
monetary policy will be explored in more detail later.
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To determine whether survey forecasts have improved over time 
and whether they depend heavily on the choice of sample period, we 
show the mean absolute forecast errors and standard deviation for sev-
eral sample periods in Table 2. There is some evidence that errors are 
smaller after 1994, especially at the one-quarter and eight-quarter ho-
rizons. However, when the sample after 1994 is split at 2003, it is clear 
that the post-1993 improvement can be attributed almost entirely to 
the most recent period from 2003 to 2007. Errors during this period are 
remarkably lower at all forecast horizons, as are standard deviations. 
A more formal analysis of these forecast errors can be performed, as 
Swanson did, by looking at whether short-term errors showed a down-
ward trend as transparency increased and determining whether these 
errors were significantly different in the pre- and post-1994 periods. 
Table 3 reports regressions of forecast errors at all four horizons sepa-
rately on a time trend, a post-94 dummy variable, and a post-2002 
dummy variable. Looking first at the regressions with the time trend, 
there is support for a reduction in forecast errors only at the one-quarter 
horizon, as the time trend is not significant at the other horizons. Inter-
estingly, and in contrast to Swanson, the post-94 dummy is not signifi-
cant at any forecast horizon, suggesting that forecasting performance in 
the survey forecast did not improve sharply after 1994. However, the 
post-2002 dummy is significant at all four horizons. Taken as a whole, 
these results suggest improvement over time in the survey forecasts for 
short-term horizons and substantial improvement at all horizons in the 
2003-07 period.6 
As noted above, compared with other studies of short-term fore-
casts, the break in the sample at 1994 does not appear to be statistically 
significant. The difference in these results appears due to the relatively 
larger errors in forecasts using federal funds futures data in the pre-1994 
period, as reported in other studies (Swanson, Kwan). In contrast, the 
short-term forecast errors in the Blue Chip Survey are smaller than the 
futures forecasts in this early time period, which may account for the 
much sharper improvement in post-1994 accuracy using federal funds 
futures data.7
Patterns in forecast errors: implications for leverage over long-term rates
As noted earlier, Swanson and others have found a pattern in the 
federal funds rate forecast errors, with larger errors when the federal Economic REviEw • ThiRd quaRTER 2008  23
Table 2
SURVEY FORECAST ERRORS OVER ALTERnATIVE  
SAMPLE PERIODS 
MEAn, ABSOLUTE ERROR, AnD (STAnDARD DEVIATIOn)
Table 3
AnALYSIS OF SURVEY FORECAST ERRORS 
(nEWEY-WEST S.E)
Period Q1 Error Q2 Error Q4 Error Q8 Error
1986-2007 .21 (.22) .52 (.48) 1.05 (.87) 1.67 (1.40)
1986-1993 .27 (.26) .60 (.50) 1.14 (.82) 2.07 (1.33)
1994-2007 .18 (.19) .47 (.47) .99 (.91) 1.40 (1.41)
1994-2002 .23 (.21) .58 (.54) 1.22 (1.02) 1.64 (1.55)
2003-2007 .07 (.04) .24 (.16) .47 (.20) .66 (.42)
   Constant Time Trend Post-94 Dummy  Post-2002 Dummy
Q1 Error .367 (.095) -.007 (.003) ------------ ------------
.270 (.090) ------------ -.094 (.102) ------------
.247 (.045) ------------ ------------ -.173 (.047)
Q2 Error .714 (.134) -.009 (.006) ------------ ------------
.595 (.128) ------------ -.126 (.172) ------------
.589 (.094) ------------ ------------ -.348 (.101)
Q4 Error 1.162 (.271) -.005 (.012) ------------ ------------
1.142 (.228) ------------ -.153 (.342) ------------
1.182 (.203) ------------ ------------ -.712 (.209)
Q8 Error 1.915 (.557) -.012 (.024) ------------ ------------
2.07 (.458) ------------ -.678 (.637) ------------
1.844 (.375) ------------ ------------ -1.18 (.460)24  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
funds rate is changing rapidly as the Federal Reserve eases or tightens 
policy. This pattern is also present in the Blue Chip survey forecast 
errors, but with two additional interesting features. In the Blue Chip 
survey, there is an asymmetry in the forecast errors, with larger errors 
when policy is being eased than in periods of tightening, especially for 
longer-horizon forecasts. In addition, there is some evidence that fore-
cast errors have been reduced over time during periods of tightening. 
In contrast, forecast errors during periods of policy easing have not 
improved significantly.
These points are illustrated in Charts 5-7, which show survey fore-
cast errors for the one-, four-, and eight-quarter horizons overlaid on 
periods in which the federal funds rate was being raised (light-shaded) 
or lowered (dark-shaded). For each survey date, the error is calculated as 
the actual federal funds rate one, four, and eight quarters ahead minus 
the survey expectation for that horizon. 
As seen in these charts, there is a general tendency for the forecasts 
to underestimate future policy actions, resulting in positive errors in 
tightening periods and negative errors in easing periods.8 In addition, 
during tightening periods, forecasters started out underestimating the 
degree of tightening that would be forthcoming (positive errors) and 
then overestimated the amount of tightening that would ultimately 
occur (negative errors). In easing periods, forecasters initially under-
estimated the amount of easing and then reduced their errors as time 
passed. Moreover, for the four- and eight-quarter forecasts, negative 
errors associated with policy easing appear especially large.9 Finally, 
across the three charts, the peak positive forecast errors appear to have 
declined somewhat over time, suggesting that forecasters’ ability to pre-
dict future policy has improved during tightening periods, with much 
of this improvement coming from the 2003-06 period. In contrast, 
peak negative errors have not shown the same decline, suggesting less 
improvement during easing periods. 
We can obtain more insight into the nature of these forecast errors 
by looking more closely at the evolution of the Blue Chip survey esti-
mates of the expected policy path. Charts 8 and 9 show the evolution 
of the federal funds rate and the Blue Chip forecasts of the expected 
policy path during the easing and tightening cycle of 1989 to 1994 and 
the easing and tightening cycle of 2000 to 2004. In the charts, the black 
line shows how the federal funds rate evolved, while the other lines 
show the evolution of the expected policy path.Economic REviEw • ThiRd quaRTER 2008  25
chart 5
OnE-QUARTER FORECAST ERRORS AnD POLICY STAnCE
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Looking first at Chart 8, in the Blue Chip survey taken in February 
1990 forecasters expected a very gradual reduction in the federal funds 
rate over the next several years. After the 1990-91 recession, the funds 
rate was reduced from around 8 percent to a low of 3 percent in 1992. 
As shown in the chart, however, forecasters continually underestimated 
the amount of future easing and thought the Federal Reserve would 
tighten policy much more quickly than turned out to be the case. Then, 
in 1993 and the beginning of 1994, forecasters significantly underesti-
mated the path of policy tightening that began in February 2004.
Chart 9 shows similar information on the actual federal funds rate 
path and the expected policy path from the Blue Chip survey for the 
period 2000-04. In november 2000, with the federal funds rate at 6.5 
percent, forecasters anticipated a very gradual reduction in the funds 
rate over the next few years. As noted earlier, the dramatic drop in the 
funds rate during 2000 and 2001 led to extremely large errors at all 
forecast horizons. As time passed, forecasters lowered their estimates 
of the future funds rate path as the actual funds rate was reduced but 
continued to expect a rapid tightening of policy, which finally occurred 
in June 2004. 
chart 9
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Interestingly,  as  discussed  earlier,  forecasters  were  much  better 
able to anticipate the tightening of policy when it finally occurred in 
2004, in part, perhaps, because of the greater guidance provided by the 
FOMC in its policy statements. Indeed, as shown in Chart 9, by no-
vember 2003, forecasters were able to accurately predict the policy path 
over the next two years, in sharp contrast to the large errors at the be-
ginning of the 1994 tightening period. Taken together, these two charts 
illustrate the continuing difficulties that forecasters have in judging the 
extent and timing of policy easing and the striking improvement that 
occurred in the 2004-06 tightening period.
Understanding the evolution of the expected policy path as shown 
in these two charts also provides some insight into the Federal Reserve’s 
leverage over longer-term interest rates. Charts 10 and 11 show what 
happened to the ten-year Treasury rate as the federal funds rate target 
changed during these periods.
Interesting similarities appear in the behavior of the long-term rate 
in the two easing periods. In both periods, the Federal Reserve made 
sharp reductions in the federal funds rate target at the beginning of 
the easing cycle. However, in both periods, long-term rates did not 
fall until much later in the easing cycle. Part of the explanation for the 
sluggish response in long-term rates can be found in the behavior of the 
expected policy paths in Charts 8 and 9. In both periods, forecasters 
anticipated little further easing and, indeed, believed that the Federal 
Reserve would begin raising rates back to neutral fairly rapidly. This 
likely prevented a larger decline in long-term rates.10
In contrast to the easing periods, long-term rates responded very 
differently in the 1994 and 2004 tightening episodes. As seen in Charts 
10 and 11, long-term rates moved up sharply at the beginning of the 
tightening cycle in 1994 but moved very little when tightening began 
in 2004. Once again, the expected policy path provides insight into 
these differences. As seen in Chart 8, in 1994, forecasters were initially 
surprised at the timing and magnitude of tightening. Expectations ad-
justed very quickly, however, and forecasters raised their estimate of the 
policy path. Moreover, they believed that the increase in the funds rate 
target was likely to be permanent rather than temporary, leading to a 
sharp increase in long-term rates. In contrast, in 2004, the expected 
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funds rate path, so that forecasters were not surprised at the timing and 
pace of tightening.11 This likely contributed to the smaller increase in 
long-term rates during this period.12 
III.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This article has examined whether private sector forecasts of mon-
etary policy have improved in recent years as the Federal Reserve has 
taken steps to increase the amount of information it provides to the 
public. The article uses information from the Blue Chip Financial Fore-
casts to look at the accuracy of forecasts of the federal funds rate over 
horizons from one quarter to two years ahead. For short-term forecast 
horizons, forecast accuracy has clearly improved, a finding similar to 
that of other studies using data from the federal funds futures market. 
There is less evidence of improvement at longer forecast horizons of 
one to two years ahead. At all horizons, however, much of the improve-
ment came from 2003 to 2006, when the Federal Reserve provided an 
unusual amount of guidance about likely future policy actions. 
The article also finds interesting patterns to the survey forecast er-
rors. As in other studies, most errors occur at turning points in the 
economy and when the Federal Reserve is actively changing policy. In 
particular, forecast errors are considerably larger at longer horizons for 
periods in which policy is eased. Moreover, forecast errors during peri-
ods of policy tightening appear to have diminished over time, while lit-
tle improvement is seen during periods of policy easing. Put differently, 
forecasters seem to have become much better at judging the amount 
and timing of policy tightening  —but less so at judging the amount and 
timing of policy easing. 
Interestingly, a sharp demarcation in forecasting performance did 
not appear in 1994, when the FOMC began announcing policy changes 
and issuing press statements after committee meetings. This suggests that 
improved forecasting performance is most likely due to the cumulative 
effects of formal steps toward greater transparency, combined with more 
predictable behavior on the part of Federal Reserve policymakers. Economic REviEw • ThiRd quaRTER 2008  31
EnDnOTES
1 The central banks of new Zealand, norway, and Sweden provide numerical 
projections of their policy interest rates as part of the forecast information released 
to the public.
2 For example, beginning with its press statement on August 12, 2003, the 
FOMC indicated that “policy accommodation can be maintained for a consider-
able period,” a phrase that was repeated for the next three meetings. Similarly, in 
its statement on May 4, 2004, the FOMC indicated that “policy accommodation 
can be removed at a pace that is likely to be measured,” a phrase that was repeated 
for the next 12 meetings.
3 The policy surprise is calculated as the difference between the actual funds 
rate on the day of a policy action and the funds rate expected on that day as de-
rived from federal funds or Eurodollar futures. Computing the expected federal 
funds rate from futures data is somewhat complicated. See Kuttner (pp. 525-30) 
for details. 
4 The Blue Chip Financial Forecasts are released at the beginning of a month 
and are based on a survey taken at toward the end of the previous month.
5 While longer horizons could be considered, they would effectively exclude 
the period since 2003 that is of particular interest.
6 With the small sample sizes of the Blue Chip long-term survey, there may 
be some concern that a few observations could be especially influential and distort 
the underlying relationships. As seen in Chart 3, there was a very large forecast 
error in november 2000 shortly before the FOMC eased policy rapidly prior to 
the 2001 recession. When this observation is removed from the estimates shown 
in Table 2, the time trend is significant at both the one-quarter and two-quarter 
forecast horizons but not at the longer horizons. The other results in Table 2 are 
not changed in a material way. Thus, this further analysis strengthens the result 
that the improvement in short-run forecast accuracy found in studies using fu-
tures data is also present in the Blue Chip survey. 
7 When the Blue Chip forecasts and federal funds futures forecasts are made 
on a comparable basis for a one-quarter forecast horizon, in the pre-1994 period, 
the mean absolute error from fed funds futures forecasts is 23 basis points, while 
the Blue Chip error is 17 basis points. Post-1994, the one-quarter forecast errors 
are essentially identical (10 basis points). The change in the forecast error for the 
federal funds futures data is statistically significant, but the change in the Blue 
Chip survey is not. While it may be surprising that survey forecast errors should 
be smaller than forecasts from futures data prior to 1994, the difference is likely 
due to the lack of liquidity in the futures markets in the first few years of their 
operation. This also suggests, however, that the federal funds futures data may not 
be reliable in the pre-1994 period.32  FeDeRal ReSeRve BanK oF KanSaS CiTy
8 The large positive error at the eight-quarter forecast horizon in Chart 7 
during the easing period in the fall of 1998 is a reflection of the fact that forecast-
ers did not expect the significant tightening of policy that occurred in 1999 and 
2000. Indeed, in the fall of 1998 and spring of 1999, the Blue Chip forecasts 
suggested that the Federal Reserve would maintain rates low for an extended 
period of time.
9 A more detailed analysis of the errors during easing and tightening periods 
compared with periods of no policy change indicates that errors in tightening pe-
riods are not statistically different from errors in no policy change periods at any 
forecast horizon. In contrast, errors in easing periods are significantly different from 
errors in no policy change periods at both the four- and eight-quarter horizons.
10 The bigger influence on long-term rates during this period appears to be a 
reduction in long-term inflation expectations as actual inflation declined over the 
period. A reduction in inflation expectations is consistent with the decline in the 
expected long-run equilibrium funds rate observed in Charts 3, 8, and 9.
11 Excerpts from the minutes of the May 2004 meeting illustrate the concern 
that FOMC members had about a sharp rise in long-term rates when tightening 
began: “The Committee focused instead on a formulation that would empha-
size that policy tightening, once it began, probably could proceed at a pace that 
would be ‘measured.’ A number of policymakers were concerned that such an as-
sertion could unduly constrain future adjustments to the stance of policy should 
the evidence emerging in coming months suggest that an appreciable firming 
would be appropriate. Others, however, saw substantial benefits to inclusion of 
the proposed language. These members noted that current economic circum-
stances made it likely that the process of returning policy to a more neutral setting 
would be more gradual, once under way, than in past episodes when inflation was 
well above levels consistent with price stability.” 
12 In addition, long-term rates appear to have been held down during this 
period by a decline in inflation expectations and by a reduction in the term pre-
mium. For more details, see Kozicki and Sellon.Economic REviEw • ThiRd quaRTER 2008  33
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